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S ince the onset of the sovereign debt crisis in Europe, some observers and policy makers alike have argued that the solution to the current crisis may be to deepen economic policy 
coordination in order to save the euro while other observers are much more negative and they 
argue that the euro is doom to fail. This book shields some light to this debate by assessing the 
governance of the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) from the launch of the Euro in 1999 until 
the emergence of the sovereign debt crisis in 2010. 
The author starts by reminding readers that EMU represents a significant departure point from 
the traditional EU decision making process, the Community method, in which the Commission 
makes a proposal and the Council and the European Parliament debate on it. Under EMU, 
monetary policy is delegated to a newly created supranational institution, the European Central 
Bank (ECB), which has the first and final say over the definition and implementation of monetary 
policy. By contrast, economic policy relies on a decentralized approach in which Member states 
are ultimately responsible for implementing their own economic policies. Member state must, 
however, follow the broad economic policy guidelines (BEPG) set out by the Commission and the 
Stability and Growth Pact (SGP). However, countries that breach these goals face no more than 
non-binding recommendations for the most part, although financial penalties and fines can be 
employed in extremis. 
The book aims to answer three specific questions surrounding the current debates about the 
governance of the euro area in particular and the EU in general: Is the single currency sustainable 
in the absence of a more centralized approach to economic policy? What conclusions can be 
drawn from EMU about the search for alternatives to the Community method? What lessons can 
be learned from the euro area’s external relations for the EU’s ambitions to be a global actor in its 
own right? To answer these questions the book starts by first focusing on the role of the ECB and 
the Eurogroup. It then analyzes the role of the Stability and Growth Pact and the BEPG. Finally, it 
looks at the external impact of EMU in the G20 and IMF decisions and in EU bilateral dialogues on 
macroeconomic policy with emerging economies.
Regarding the ECB the author finds that, contrary to some rational choice literature that 
argues that EU institutions are “competence maximizers” and thus would prefer more Community 
method in policy making, the ECB has proved to be reluctant do so. The reason for this, it is argued, 
is that the Bank’s preference for “more Europe” is contingent on its overriding commitment to 
price stability. The author justifies these findings by looking at the cases of anti-fraud policy, the 
ECB views on the debates for establishing a Constitution for Europe between 2002 and 2003 
and the role of the bank towards financial supervision and further economic policy coordination. 
Regarding the latter, one of the most interesting findings is that ECB officials appear to be against 
further economic governance where this is perceived to be a threat to price stability. This is 
consistent with the author’s findings regarding the other institution tailor-made for the euro-
area, the Eurogroup, composed of euro area finance ministers. In this case, the ECB has been 
systematically against providing this group with more oversight on economic policy coordination 
because of fear that this would threat price stability. 
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While the findings regarding the ECB and the Eurogroup are interesting, the author does not 
clearly explain his selection of the cases used to illustrate the findings. This may lend itself to some 
questions regarding the applicability of the findings.
The chapters dedicated to the Stability and Growth Pact and the Broad Economic Policy 
Guidelines are one of the most interesting in the book as the author challenges some well-
established institutional analyses that claim there is a specific link between electoral regimes and 
budget outcomes. Specifically, analysing the Stability and Growth Pact, the author finds that while 
political institutions affect budget institutions, it is not always true that member states electing 
single-party majorities that tend to “delegate” control of the budgetary process to powerful 
finance ministers have a harder time to comply with fiscal discipline than countries that elect 
broad coalition governments and that must rely on numerical rules or other types of “contracts” 
to enforce fiscal discipline. 
While the author agrees that, in general “contract” states fare better in respecting the rules 
of the Stability and Growth pact, as he shows in the case of the countries that triggered an Ecofin 
recommendation to end excessive budget deficit, he argues that some cases do not fit nicely in 
this picture. He illustrates this point by highlighting the cases of Spain, Ireland and Austria, typical 
“delegation” states that achieved a remarkable degree of compliance with the Stability and Growth 
Pact rules from the late 1990s until the onset of the current financial crisis in 2007. The author 
argues that a possible explanation to this “puzzle” is that “delegation” states that had more 
stringent fiscal rules had a better time to comply with the Stability and Growth Pact. Using data 
from the Commission’s index of fiscal rules he finds some support for his claim as the data shows an 
increase in the scores for the three countries since the late 1990s, especially in the case of Spain. 
One insight from this chapter, and that the author forgets to mention, is that there could 
be room for further econometric analyses, which could better test his assumption that domestic 
stringent fiscal rules may have an impact on member state compliance with the EU fiscal rules. 
This would provide further evidence and insight for the growing literature on domestic institutions 
and budget outcomes. 
The chapter on the Broad Economic Policy Guidelines (BEPG) is equally significant regarding 
the insight that it provides. The author finds that such economic guidelines, which are overarching 
objectives for the economic policies of member states adopted by the Economic and Financial 
Affairs Council (Ecofin) upon recommendation from the European Commission, suffer from 
serious structural shortcomings. First, they lack a credible sanctioning institution. While the treaty 
article regulating the BEPG stipulate that member states should exercise “peer pressure” and 
make non-binding recommendations to other members who breach the BEPG, in practice policy 
makers have not wanted to issue such recommendations for fear of triggering a political backlash. 
Similarly, there is quite a lot of uncertainty regarding the specific content of such non-binding 
recommendations. Finally, BEPG sanctions may have little currency in domestic political arenas 
unless the Government’s opposition forces support such sanctions.
The author illustrates his findings by using the case of Ireland in 2001, when the Ecofin 
criticized the Irish budget for pushing tax cuts and capital expenditure increases that were seen as 
not necessary given the benign economic environment. This move generated a political backlash in 
Ireland with the finance minister criticising the move and receiving strong popular support. Equally, 
the Commission’s reprimand of Greece for breaching the BEPG in February 2010, unleashed a 
significant wave of strikes and protests. However, in this latter case, it is not completely clear 
whether the wave of strikes and protests were generated by the Greek Government’s decision to 
freeze wages or by the Commission’s actions.
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Notwithstanding some shortcomings, the main insight of this chapter is that other “peer 
pressure” mechanisms, most notably the Open Method of Coordination, lack from the same 
problems regarding sanctioning criteria and lack of participation by key stakeholders for fear of 
generating a political backlash. This may point towards the need for more comparative research 
that illustrates on cases in which the BEPG and the OMC have been used.
The last two chapters analyse the role of the EMU at the international level. The main issue 
here is that the treaties that led to EMU are unclear in specifying who is in charge for EMU’s 
external representation. The main finding of the chapters is therefore that in cases in which 
there is agreement among member states in international forums, EU members states have been 
successful in forging an international consensus on policy responses to the current financial crisis, 
such as in the meetings of the G20. By contrast, the case of Greece since 2010 illustrates that deep 
disagreement among euro-area members made necessary to call the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF) to rely on its “expertise” in dealing with countries’ fiscal crises. While the author is right 
in pointing out that euro-area members, especially France and Germany, have had a significant 
degree of influence in the package of measures negotiated since 2010 with Greece, this case also 
marks the limits of EMU influence at the international level.
The author is perhaps too quick to conclude that EMU’s decentralised approach to economic 
policy coordination is here to stay. In this sense, it may be interesting to discuss further the 
European Commission’s proposals on EU economic governance drafted in 2010. While this 
is still a subject of negotiation, the author is right in pointing out that the proposals do not 
alter the EMU’s decentralised approach to economic policy since member states will still be in 
charge of implementing economic policies. The main difference is that the proposals set out 
more stringent budget requirements than in the SGP. In addition, they even contemplate some 
pecuniary sanctions against non-complying member-states. However, given the recent failure of 
some member states to comply with the SGP and the reluctance to use peer pressure mechanisms 
such as those contemplated in the BEPG and the OMC, as illustrated in the book, how likely is 
that the new set of rules for economic policy coordination will work? More broadly, how likely 
is EMU to weather successfully the current financial crisis that has affected some of its members 
and put them on the verge of exiting the Euro?
Overall, this book is well structured and the chapters seem to address well the research 
questions set out at the beginning. The author relies on a significant amount of well selected 
primary and secondary sources and the book is a good contribution to the academic literature 
on the functioning of the EMU since the launch of the Euro. As such, it will be of interest to 
academics and practitioners interested in the role of EMU institutions and economic policy 
coordination in euro-area countries. 
Leandro N. Carrera, 
Pensions Policy Institute and London School of Economics, UK 
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